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EFFICIENCY LOSS OF MIXED EQUILIBRIUM BEHAVIORS 
WITH POLYNOMIAL COST FUNCTIONS
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the efficiency loss of selfish rout-
ing simultaneously with user equilibrium (UE) player and 
Cournot-Nash (CN) players. The upper bound of the effi-
ciency loss of UE-CN mixed equilibrium with polynomial cost 
functions is obtained by the scaling method and the non-
linear programming method, respectively. It is shown that 
the upper bound of efficiency loss obtained by the scaling 
method only depends on the polynomial degree of the link 
travel cost function and the upper bound of efficiency loss 
obtained by the nonlinear programming method depends on 
the number of the CN players besides the aforementioned 
factors. The numerical tests validate our analytical results.
KEY WORDS
efficiency loss, UE-CN mixed equilibrium, variational inequal-
ity, selfish routing game
1. INTRODUCTION
Concerning the routing choice behaviour in net-
works, Wardrop presented two famous principles: the 
user equilibrium (UE) and the system optimum (SO)1. 
The UE principle states that every traveller aims to 
minimize their own cost so that no traveller can re-
duce the cost by unilaterally changing their choice at 
the equilibrium. In the game theory version, the traffic 
assignment under the UE principle can be regarded as 
a non-cooperative Nash game with many infinitesimal 
users, and all users are competitive to each other. It is, 
in the game terminology, a non-atomic routing game. 
In the case of SO, it is assumed that there exists a 
central organization to minimize the total cost of the 
system, all users being cooperative and instructed by 
a single player. The above two principles only consider 
the two extreme cases, i.e., there are many infinitesi-
mal players in the UE principle and there is only one 
central player in the SO principle. Haurie and Marcotte 
investigated the network with some non-cooperative 
Cournot–Nash (CN) players, where the users belonging 
to the same player can fully cooperate with each other 
and different players will compete with each other2. 
The users of one CN player aim to minimize their own 
total cost while competing with the users of other play-
ers. Harker examined that the network users can be 
divided into different CN players and UE users and ob-
tained a new network equilibrium model3. Yang et al. 
considered such a situation in which the network has 
an additional player aiming to improve the overall sys-
tem performance by controlling part of flows and fur-
ther extended the above model4. Recently, Yang and 
Zhang studied the existence of anonymous link tolls 
in network with UE-CN mixed equilibrium behaviours5
It is well known that the UE is generally not identi-
cal with the SO as viewed from the total system cost. 
However, the gap between the SO and the UE in the 
worst case had been unknown for a long time. Pa-
padimitriou presented the efficiency loss (the price of 
anarchy) to measure the efficiency loss for the user’s 
selfish behaviour and defined it as the largest ratio be-
tween the total cost of Nash equilibrium and the total 
cost of an optimal solution achieved by centralized 
control6. Later, Roughgarden and Tardos introduced 
it into the traffic network and used it to quantify the 
difference between the UE and the SO7. Recently, re-
searchers have extended the above works in different 
aspects8-10. However, these researches are restricted 
to the non-atomic routing game, i.e. the routing game 
only has the UE player with homogeneous users. In 
addition to non-atomic routing games, Cominetti et al. 
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studied the efficiency loss in the atomic games with 
splittable flows11. Yang et al. investigated the efficiency 
loss of the selfish routing with the atomic CN players12.
However, few scholars studied the efficiency loss 
of the network simultaneously with UE player and CN 
players. In this paper, we study the efficiency loss of 
UE-CN mixed equilibrium. We suppose that all users 
following the UE principle in their routing decisions are 
considered as one single UE player and every CN play-
er controls a strictly positive splittable flow. Under this 
assumption, we use two methods to investigate the ef-
ficiency loss of the UE-CN mixed equilibrium.
2. MIXED EQUILIBRIUM OF THE 
UE AND CN PLAYERS
Let ,G N A= ^ h be a directed transportation network, 
where N  and A denote the sets of nodes and links, re-
spectively. U  represents the UE player (covering all users 
following UE principle) in the network. Let K  be the set 
of CN players in the network; WU  be the set of Origin-
Destination (OD) pairs where users obey UE principle; 
Wk  be the set of OD pairs where users are controlled by 
a CN player k K! . Define W WK k K k,/ ! , W W WU K,/ . 
Let dw  be the demand between OD pair w W! ; Rw  be 
the set of paths connecting OD pair w W! .
Other notations used in this paper are as follows: frw  
is the flow on path r Rw! , w W! ; 1arwd =  if the path 
r Rw!  traverses link a A! , and 0arw =d  otherwise; vaU  
is the UE flow on link a; , , , ,v v vvU aU aU aU1 1g g/ - +^ h is the 
vector of link flows by UE player; vak  is the CN flow on 
link a; , , , ,v v vva aU a ak1 g g/ ^ h is the vector of all flows on 
link a; , , , ,v v vvk ak ak ak1 1g g/ +-^ h is the vector of all link 






is the total flow by all CN players on link a; 
, , , ,v v v vK k k k1 1g g/ - +^ h; v v va aU aK= +  is the total flow 
on link a. Define ,v v vU K/ ^ h. Let t va a^ h denote the av-
erage cost of traversing link a A! . This cost function 
is assumed to be separable in link flows and twice con-
tinuously differentiable.
Suppose all OD demands are fixed. Thus, the fea-
sible sets of link flows by the UE player and the CN 
players can be defined as follows:
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All users in the UE player aim to minimize their per-
sonal travel costs under the current routing decisions 
of the CN players, which is equivalent to solve








^ h/ # , (3)
where the variables ,v a AaK !  are taken as fixed. If 
t va a^ h is strictly increasing, then the minimization prob-
lem (3) has a unique solution.
All users in the CN player k K!  aim to minimize 
the total travel cost of this specific player under the 
current routing decision of other players, i.e.,

















In (4), vaU  and , ,v a A k Kak ! !-  are taken as fixed, 
,v k Kak !  as the variable. It is easy to show that if t va a^ h 
is convex, the minimization problem (4) has a unique 
solution.
The solution simultaneously satisfying the optimal-
ity conditions of the minimization problems (3) and (4) 
is called the UE-CN mixed equilibrium solution. The 
condition for simultaneous minimization of the prob-
lems (3) and (4) can be formulated as the following 
variational inequity (VI):3
Lemma 1 Suppose ,t v a Aa a !^ h  is strictly increas-
ing and convex, the vector ,v v, ,mix U mix K^ h is the UE-CN 
mixed equilibrium of (3) and (4) if and only if the fol-
lowing inequality holds









l^ ^^ ^h hh h1/
, , .k Kv vU U k k! ! !X X  (5)
where v v v, ,amix amix U amix K= + , a A! .
Since t va a^ h is strictly increasing and convex, the VI 
problem (5) has at least one solution. Define the vec-
tor of the link costs perceived by the UE and CN players 
on link a A!  as
, , ,t v t v v t v t v v t vc va a a a a a a a a a a a
K
a a
1 f= + +l l^ ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^h h h hh h h,
 (6)
where ,vv va aU aK/ ^ h and K  is the number of 
CN players. For arbitrary two flows v va a! u , if 
, 0c cv v v v >a a a a T a a- -u u^ ^^ h hh  holds, where ,$ $  is in-
ner product, then the VI problem (5) has at most one 
solution.13 It is obvious that the VI problem (5) has a 
unique solution if t va a^ h is an affine and strictly mono-
tone function for each link a A! . When the link travel 
cost function is polynomial function, Boulogne et al. 
proved the uniqueness of the UE-CN mixed equilibri-
um.14 This is again described below.
Lemma 2 Suppose that the link travel cost function 
takes a polynomial form as t v t va a a a a p0 a= +^ ^h h , 
where ta0  is a nonnegative constant free flow travel 
cost on link a A! , aa  is a link specific nonnegative pa-
rameter, and p p0 < < *. If the number of Nash players 
in problem (5) is limited, then the solution is unique. 
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Here p K K3 1 1*= - -^ ^h h where K  is the num-
ber of CN players in the network.
Let ,v v v, ,mix mix U mix K= ^ h and ,v v a AAmix amix != ^ h  be 
the solution vector of the VI problem (5) and the vec-
tor of the aggregate link flow in the UE-CN mixed equi-
librium, respectively. Then, the total travel cost of the 
system can be written as 














^ ^h h/ //
Let ,v v v, ,so so U so K= ^ h and vvAso aso= ^ h, a A!  respec-
tively be the solution and the aggregate link flow of the 
following optimization problem:
min t v v
v a a aa A! !X







If t va a^ h is strictly increasing and convex, then the prob-
lem (7) has a unique solution in terms of the aggregate 
link flows va. We use vaso  to denote the unique link flow 
solution of the problem (7). Note that the link flows 
v ,aso U  and , ,v k K a A,aso k ! !  may not be unique, but





is unique. The efficiency loss of the UE-CN mixed equi-
































Since T vso^ h measures the minimal total travel cost 
of the system and T vmix^ h is the sum of all subsystems’ 
minimal travel costs, hence 1$t  holds. Next we fo-
cus on finding the upper bound of t.
3. BOUNDING THE EFFICIENCY LOSS 
OF UE-CN MIXED EQUILIBRIUM
Let ,v v v, ,so so U so K= ^ h be a solution of the minimi-
zation problem (7). Note that v ,so U U! X , v ,so k k! X , 
k K! . Substituting v v ,aU aso U=  and v v ,ak aso k=  in the VI 
problem (5), for





we can obtain the next chain of inequalities and equal-
ities:









^ ^ ^h h h/ //




l ^ ^h h//













l^ ^ ^h h h/ //











^ ^ ^^h h hh/ /




l ^ ^h h//
For





if t v t va a a a a p0 a= +^ ^h h , then t v p va a a a p 1a= -l ^ ^h h . It fol-
lows
T T v v vv v0 mix so a amix p aso p aso
a A
# # + +a -
!
^ ^ ^ ^^h h h h h/




-^ ^h h//  (9)
If we can find an upper bound for the sum of the 
second and the third terms in the right-hand side 
(RHS) of (9), we then obtain the efficiency loss of the 
VI problem (5). Now, we derive the upper bound of (8) 
by the scaling method and the nonlinear programming 
method, respectively. The scaling method is intro-
duced as follows.
From inequality (9) we have






^ ^ ^ ^^h h h h h'/





maxT v v vv
0, 0, ,
so











$ $ ! ! !
^ ^ ^^h h h h'/




-^ ^h h1// . (10)
Since the feasible region of v 0aU $  and v 0ak $ , 
k K!  for every link a A!  is larger than that of X , the 
last inequality of (10) is satisfied.
Consider the following inequality:

























c ^m h/ , (11)
where the first, second and last inequalities are satis-
fied respectively due to
v v2
1 0,ak amix k
2
$-` j , ,k K v 0ak6 ! $  and






Since p v 0a amix p 1 $a -^ h , inequality (10) is equivalent to







# + +a -
$
!
^ ^ ^ ^^h h h h h'/








-^ ^h h 1/ . (12)





p1 2 1= + -- +^ ^ ^ ^ ^h h h h h ,
0,va 3! + h6 . Obviously, F va^ h is continuous in do-
main, so the second term in the RHS of (12) has the 
maximum within ,v v0a amix! 6 @ as long as we can obtain 
F v 0a #l^ h  under the condition v va amix$ . It is easy to 
know





p1= + - +-l^ ^ ^ ^ ^h h h h h ,
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F v p v p p v2 1a a
mix p
a
p1 1= - +- -m^ ^ ^ ^h h h h  and
F v p p p v1 1a a p 2=- + - -n^ ^ ^ ^h h h h .
For v v 0a amix$ $ , we have F v 0a #n^ h , this means 
F van^ h decreases with the variable ,v va amix 3! + h6 . 
Then we have





mix p1 1# = - + =- -m m^ ^ ^ ^ ^h h h h h
p p v2 0amix p2 1 #=- + -^ ^h h . (13)
The inequality (13) shows that F val^ h decreases 
with the variable ,v va amix 3! + h6 . Since
F v p v2 0a
mix
a
mix p #=-l^ ^h h ,
we get F v F v 0a amix# #l l^ ^h h  under the condition 
v va amix$ . Thus, we conclude that the second term in 
the RHS of (12) has the maximum within ,v0 amix6 @. Re-
write the inequality (12) as







# a+ - +
$
!
^ ^ ^ ^^h h h h h'/






1 2+ a =
!
-^ ^h h 1/













^ ^ ^^h h h h
6 @'
/









-^ ^h h 1/







2 1 1 #= + + a-
!
!
+ +^ ` ^h j h
6 @
/



















2 1# + + -
!
+^ ` ^h j h
6 @
. (14)
The first equation is satisfied as v uva amix= , 
,u 0 1! 6 @. Because of (8), 1$t , so we have to define
max u p u u1 4,u
p
0 1





max u p u u4 1,u
p
0 1





Thus we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1 Suppose that link travel cost function t va a^ h, 
a A!  is a polynomial function and p is the highest de-
gree of the polynomial function, ,v v v, ,mix mix U mix K= ^ h, 
v ,mix U U! X , v ,mix k k! X , k K!  is a solution of problem 
(5) and ,v v v, ,so so U so K= ^ h, v ,so U U! X , v ,so k k! X , k K!  
is a solution of problem (7). Then the efficiency loss t 
of the UE-CN mixed equilibrium satisfies
max u p u u1 4,u
p
0 1





Corollary 1. If all link travel cost functions are affine 
functions, then the efficiency loss of the VI problem (5) 
is not greater than 3/2.
Proof: Let p 1=  in Theorem 1, then

















From (15), we have
2
3#t .
The above analyses show that in the scaling meth-
od, the efficiency loss of the UE-CN mixed equilibrium 
is irrelevant to the number of CN players in the net-
work.
Next, we use the nonlinear programming method 
to further discuss the efficiency loss. In order to get 
the upper bound for the sum of the second and third 
terms in the RHS of (9), we first investigate the follow-
ing nonlinear programming:








^ ^^ h h h"




-^ ^h h1/ . (16)
Let
G v v vva a amix p a p a= +a -^ ^ ^^h h h h




-^ ^h h/ .
Since the Hessian matrix of G va^ h is negative semi-
definite matrix, function G va^ h is a concave function 
of the variables v 0aU $  and v 0ak $ , k K!  in the case 
p 0> . Then we conclude G va^ h has a global maximum. 
Let aUm  and akm , a A!  be the Lagrange multipliers as-
sociated with v 0aU $  and v 0ak $ , k K! . Then we get 
the first-order optimality conditions of (16) as follows:
v p v1 0a amix p a a p aUa a m- + + =^ ^ ^h h h , (17)
0aU $m , v 0aU aUm = , (18)
v p v1a amix p a a p+ +a a-^ ^ ^h h h
  0p v v ,a amix p amix k ak1+ + =a m-^ h , k K! , (19)
, v0 0ak ak ak$m m = , k K! . (20)









For each given link, we can find that problem (16) 














c m . (22)
If condition (21) holds, it is easy to get 0aUm =  and 
v 0aU $  from (17) and (18). Substituting (21) into (19), 
we obtain
p v v 0,a amix p amix k ak1a m+ =-^ h , k K! , (23)
which are fulfilled only for v 0,amix k =  and 0akm = , k K! , 
according to (20). In that occasion, we have
v v v p v v v v, ,a amix p a p a a amix p amix k ak amix k
k K
1a a- + -
!
-^ ^^ ^ ^h h h h h/
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^ ccc ch m m m m











+c c ^m m h
  p
p









c c ^m m h . (24)
The last inequality of (24) follows from the fact that 
t 0a0 $ , a A! .
If condition (22) holds, referring to (17) and (18), 
we have 0>aUm  and v 0aU = . Next, we study the rela-
tion between the efficiency loss and the set K  through 
analyzing the following two cases.
Case 1: K 1= .
In this case, v va acn=  where vacn denotes the flow 
of CN player on link a and V v,amix cn a amixl= , 0 1a# #l  
where by convention 1al =  if v v 0,amix cn amix= = . Sub-














From (16), we have








^ ^^ h h h"
















+ +^ c c ^h m m h














- =+c ^m h; E
va a amix p 1 #= a h +^ h















-^ c ch m m









l l-c m; E . (26)
The inequality of (25) is satisfied from the fact that 
t 0a0 $ , a A! .
Case 2: K 2$ .




























for a A!  with 0 1a# #b , 0 1a# #c , 0 , 1a a# #b c . 
From (19), it is easy to get 0v >ak
r  and v 0ak =  for k k! r . 
Since


















c m , a A! . (27)
Therefore, we can obtain the followivng result from 
(16):








^ ^^ h h h"





















- +^ c c ^h m m h














b b- +c ^m h; E












va a amix p 1# #a w +^ h ,

































h; E . (29)












k K k k
a
mix k
k K k k
2 2$ =
-! !! !r r












h  and t 0a0 $ , a A! .
In this paper, we mainly consider the network with 
both UE and CN players. If K 1= , (24) or (25) will be 


















Thus, inequality (9) can be rewritten as
T T Tv v vmix so mix# + }^ ^ ^h h h. (32)



















Then, inequality (9) can be rewritten as
T T Tv v vmix so mix# + p^ ^ ^h h h. (35)
Finally, we get the following theorem:
Theorem 2 Suppose the link travel cost function t va a^ h, 
a A!  is a polynomial function, ,v v v, ,mix mix U mix K= ^ h, 
v ,mix U U! X , v ,mix k k! X , k K!  be a solution of the 
VI problem (5) and ,v v v, ,so so U so K= ^ h, v ,so U U! X , 
v ,so k k! X , k K!  be a solution of problem (7). We have








where K  is the set of CN players in the network, K  
is the number of CN players, }  is defined by equations 
(26), (30) and (31), p  by equations (29), (33) and (34).
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4. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Consider a directed graph consisting of 4 nodes 
and 5 links (see Figure 1). The link travel cost func-
tions are defined as .t 1 81 = , t 02 = , t v3 3= , t 04 = , 
.t 2 65 = , respectively. There are two OD pairs, name-
ly (1,4) and (2,4) with fixed demands d 114 =  and 
d 124 = , respectively.
The SO link flow solution can be obtained by solving 
the following minimization problem:
. .min v v v1 8 2 61 3 2 5+ +^ h
s.t. v v 11 2+ =
 v v v2 4 3+ =
 v v 14 5+ =
 v 0i $ , , ,i 1 5f= .
for reaching the first minimum gives .v v 1 8 0U31 3+ - =  








for realizing the second minimum leads to 
.v v2 2 6 0U31 3+ - = . The UE-CN mixed equilibrium so-
lution is as follows:
v 0,mix cn1 = , v 0,mix cn2 = , .v 0 8,mix cn3 = , .v 0 8,mix cn4 = ,
.v 0 2,mix cn5 = , v 0,mix U1 = , v 1,mix U2 = , v 1,mix U3 = ,
v 0,mix U4 = , v 0,mix U5 = .
The aggregate link flow is v 0mix1 = , v 1mix2 = , 
.v 1 8mix3 = , .v 0 8mix4 = , .v 0 2mix5 =  which generates 
the system’s total travel cost 3.76. Thus, the efficiency 
loss is 3.76 . .2 8 1 3429t = = .
Result . .1 3429 1 5#t =  satisfies the statement 
in Corollary 1. Based on the definition v v,amix cn a amixl= , 
0 1a# #l  where by convention 1al =  if 
v v 0,amix cn amix= = . Then, 11l = , 02l = , .0 44443l = , 














-^ c ch m m









l l-c m; E ,




















.0 251 2} }= = , .0 32413} = ,
.0 254 5} }= =  and .0 3241} = .
Thus, the bound becomes .1 1 47951#t }- =-^ h , 
according to Theorem 2. It should be noted that the 
computational burden of the scaling method is less 
than the nonlinear programming method, but the up-
per bound of efficiency loss given by the nonlinear 
programming method is more tight than that by the 
scaling method
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the upper 
bounds of the efficiency loss in a network with both UE 
player and CN players, respectively, using the scaling 
method and the nonlinear programming method. The 
analytical results show that the upper bound obtained 
by each of the two methods depends on the polyno-
mial degree of the link travel cost functions. Further-
more, the upper bound by the nonlinear programming 
method is relevant to the number of CN players. The 
numerical results illustrate that our analytical results 







Figure 1 - The network used in the example.
The optimal solution is v 1so1 = , v 0so2 = , 
v v 1so so3 4= = , v 0vo5 =  and the total travel cost is 2.8.
Suppose OD pair (1,4) is governed by users belong-
ing to UE player and OD pair (2,4) by the CN player. 
The UE-CN mixed equilibrium is obtained by solving the 
following two minimization problems simultaneously:









= + + +^ h# # #
s.t. v v 1U U1 2+ =
 v vU U2 3=
 v 0iU $ , , ,i 1 2 3= .
and
2.6 0min z v v v v vU2 51 41 3 31 31= + + +^ h
s.t. 1v v41 51+ =
 v v41 31=
 , , 0v v v31 41 51 $ .
i.e.,
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implement than the nonlinear programming method, 
but gives a larger upper bound. This states that for 
getting a smaller upper bound of the efficiency loss, 
more factors should be taken into account. Our ongo-
ing study is to explore the efficiency loss of the UE-CN 
mixed equilibrium with elastic demand.
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